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Abs t rac t  
The setting of quantitative, time-limited targets backed up by institutional and managerial 
rewards and sanctions has been a notable feature of performance improvement efforts in 
the National Health Service (NHS) in England since 1998 and especially in the period 
2000-2004.   
Performance improved in the areas covered by English NHS targets, most markedly in 
relation to waiting times, but also in relation to treatment outcomes.  None of the other 
parts of the United Kingdom followed England and similar trends were not observed, 
particularly not in waiting times, despite similar injections of funds.   
Despite the improvements in performance in target areas, targets were criticised, 
principally, for having perverse and unintended consequences (e.g. distorting priorities, 
encouraging gaming, etc) which could have potentially out-weighed their benefits.  On 
the other hand most experts in performance improvement in public services argue that 
carefully chosen, incentivised targets are a useful part of the performance management 
repertoire when used well (e.g. when sanctions and rewards are proportionate).  Some 
dysfunctional consequences are to be expected, but can be mitigated.  
Given the similarities between the English NHS and the New Zealand public health 
system, there is scope to use targets and related incentives sparingly to improve 
performance in New Zealand in areas of high importance to government and the public. 
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Use of Targets to Improve  
Health System Performance: 
English NHS Experience and 
Implications for New Zealand 
1 Summary  
The setting of quantitative, time-limited targets by government on behalf of patients and 
tax payers backed up by rewards and sanctions related to performance in meeting these 
targets has been a notable feature of performance improvement efforts in the National 
Health Service (NHS) in England since 1998 and especially in the period 2000-2004.   
This paper outlines the system of 'star ratings (global ratings based on performance in 
relation to a range of targets) and league tables used in the English NHS; summarises 
the evidence on the impact of this regime; discusses the main criticisms of the use of 
targets; assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the use of targets to drive 
performance management; describes what has been learned; and draws out the 
implications for New Zealand's public health system. 
The star rating system and publication of league tables was accompanied by an incentive 
system that was directed at holding the boards and, especially, the chief executives, of 
hospitals and other NHS organisations accountable for the local delivery of national 
priorities.  The chief executives of zero rated NHS Trusts were at risk of dismissal along 
with their chairs.  High performing NHS Trusts were able to take advantage of an incentive 
system that focused on earned autonomy as a reward for success.  In addition, funds 
were set aside at provider level (not controlled by the commissioners/purchasers) to 
support Trust incentive and reward schemes. 
Performance improved over time in the areas covered by English NHS targets, most 
markedly in relation to waiting times, but also in relation to treatment outcomes.  
Performance began to improve before most of the recent growth in NHS spending and 
capacity.  The trends suggest that the setting of targets with related league tables and 
incentives was causally associated with a substantial part of the observed improvement.  
For example, in 1999, 4.4% of patients on hospital waiting lists had waited more than 12 
months before receiving treatment.  By 2003, only a handful of patients (less than 0.1%) 
were waiting more than 12 months.  In the period after targets were set, premature deaths 
from cancers and coronary heart disease fell faster in England than in any other European 
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country, though admittedly from a high base.  For example, the cancer death rate for 
people under 75 years fell by over 12% between 1999 and 2003.   
None of the other parts of the United Kingdom followed England in setting quantitative, 
time-limited targets, backed up by managerial rewards and sanctions, and similar trends 
were not observed, particularly not in waiting times, despite similar injections of funds.  
Indeed, waiting times deteriorated in 1999-2001 outside England.  In Scotland, 
comparative clinical performance data were published, but without the incentives and 
external scrutiny put in place in England, the initiative had no discernible effect on 
performance.  Progress in England eventually put pressure on other parts of the United 
Kingdom to emulate England. 
Despite the improvements in performance in target areas, targets, and particularly, global 
star ratings, were criticised, principally, for being too rigid (i.e. not allowing for local 
variation in priorities), and for having perverse and unintended consequences (e.g. 
distorting managerial and clinical priorities, omitting important aspects of performance, 
over-simplifying performance assessment, encouraging gaming, etc) which could 
potentially have out-weighed their benefits.  On the other hand most experts in 
performance improvement in public services argue that carefully chosen, incentivised 
targets are a useful part of the performance management repertoire when used well (e.g. 
when sanctions and rewards are proportionate) since they can focus organisations 
positively on the goals of government.  Some dysfunctional consequences are to be 
expected, but can be mitigated (e.g. by modifying the way in which performance is 
measured).  
The policy challenge is to maximise the benefits and minimise the costs of targets rather 
than ignoring their potential contribution to performance.  Given the similarities between 
the English NHS and the New Zealand public health system, there is scope to use targets 
and related incentives to improve performance in New Zealand in areas of high 
importance to government and the public.  On the other hand, any target regime would 
need to be crafted to take account the particular features of the New Zealand system. 
2  In t roduc t ion  
Performance measurement
1
 and management are important elements in the range of 
methods available to improve performance in publicly financed health systems.  There are 
three aspects: measurement; analysis; and action.  Taken together, they are seen as 
contributing to solving the many principal-agent problems which exist in health care 
systems due to information asymmetries, and divergent incentives and goals between 
principals and agents.  While performance measurement is widespread in OECD 
countries and is used, in principle, to improve accountability of agencies in the health 
sector, raise performance and provide consumers with information about health care 
choices and quality, analysis leading to action is much less frequently found and its 
consequences relatively poorly understood.   
                                                                
1 Schyve (1995, p231 cited in Mannion and Goddard, 2002) defines performance measurement as, ‘the quantitative measurement of 
the results of health care (e.g. patient health outcomes, patients’ and other customers’ satisfaction and resource use), and of 
processes that are so closely associated with the results of care, that they can be used as surrogates for the anticipated results.’  The 
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organisations (1990, p1 cited in Mannion and Goddard, 2002) defines a 
performance indicator as: ‘a quantitative measure that can be used to monitor and evaluate the quality of important governance, 
managerial, clinical and support functions that affect patient outcome.’ 
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One particular approach to performance measurement and management which has 
attracted considerable attention in the last five years or so, is the setting of explicit, 
quantitative, time-limited targets by governments and other funders of health services 
backed up by an incentive regime of rewards and sanctions related to performance in 
meeting these targets.  Such a target-driven performance management regime has been 
an important component in the wider performance improvement efforts in the National 
Health Service (NHS) in England especially since the publication of the NHS Plan in 2000 
and particularly in the period 2000-2004.  From 2004, more emphasis has been given to 
individual patient choice as a driver of improvement though targets remain in place.  Given 
the similarities between the objectives and challenges facing the publicly financed health 
systems of New Zealand and the UK, it is worth considering what can be learned from the 
English experience of using targets to improve performance. 
This paper outlines the system of 'star ratings and league tables used in the English 
NHS from 1998 to 2005; summarises the evidence on the impact of this regime; discusses 
the main criticisms of the use of targets; assesses the strengths and weaknesses of the 
use of targets to drive performance management; describes what has been learned; and 
draws out the implications for New Zealand's public health system. 
In the context of public services and performance improvement, a target can be seen as 
a desired process or outcome that has been codified. (Collins et al, 2005, p1); i.e. the 
process or outcome has not only been specified, but it has been incorporated into some 
system of hierarchical oversight, performance monitoring and accountability.  A target is 
thus a performance indicator embedded in a particular set of organisational incentives. 
In the UK context, government targets are quantified, time-specific goals which are built 
into the Public Service Agreements (PSAs) which have been negotiated annually since 
1998 between the central government departments responsible for particular public 
services and the Treasury on the basis of which funding is made available, and which are 
signed by the relevant ministers and the Chancellor of the Exchequer (see Box 1).  
 
Box 1: UK Public Service Agreements (PSAs) 
Public Service Agreements (PSAs) were introduced in the 1998 Comprehensive Spending Review 
(CSR). They set out agreed targets detailing the outputs and outcomes departments are expected 
to deliver with the resources allocated to them.  The new spending regime places a strong 
emphasis on outcome targets, for example in providing for better health and higher educational 
standards or service standards.  The Government monitors progress against PSA targets, and 
departments report in detail twice a year in their annual Departmental Reports (published in spring) 
and in their autumn performance reports. These reports provide Parliament and the public with 
regular updates on departments performance against their targets.  Technical Notes explain how 
performance against each PSA target will be measured. 
 
In the case of the English NHS, the Department of Healths PSA targets (Box 2 sets out 
the Departments current targets following the 2004 Spending Review) are incorporated 
into the managerial performance assessment and incentive system operated by the 
Department of Health for NHS provider organisations and commissioners (Primary Care 
Trusts (PCTs)). 
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Box 2:  Department of Health PSA Objectives and performance targets, 2005-2008 
Objective I: Improve the health of the population. By 2010 increase life expectancy at birth in 
England to 78.6 years for men and to 82.5 years for women 
1. Substantially reduce mortality rates by 2010: 
  from heart disease and stroke and related diseases by at least 40% in people under 75,with at 
least a 40% reduction in the inequalities gap between the fifth of areas with the worst health and 
deprivation indicators and the population as a whole; 
  from cancer by at least 20% in people under 75,with a reduction in the inequalities gap of at 
least 6% between the fifth of areas with the worst health and deprivation indicators and the 
population as a whole; and 
  from suicide and undetermined injury by at least 20%. 
2. Reduce health inequalities by 10% by 2010 as measured by infant mortality and life expectancy 
at birth. 
3. Tackle the underlying determinants of ill health and health inequalities by: 
  reducing adult smoking rates to 21% or less by 2010, with a reduction in prevalence among 
routine and manual groups to 26% or less; 
  halting the year-on-year rise in obesity among children under 11 by 2010 in the context of a 
broader strategy to tackle obesity in the population as a whole. Joint with the Department for 
Education and Skills and the Department for Culture, Media and Sport; and 
  reducing the under-18 conception rate by 50% by 2010 as part of a broader strategy to improve 
sexual health. Joint with the Department for Education and Skills. 
Objective II: Improve health outcomes for people with long-term conditions 
4. Improve health outcomes for people with long-term conditions by offering a personalised care 
plan for vulnerable people most at risk; and to reduce emergency bed days by 5% by 2008, 
through improved care in primary care and community settings for people with long-term 
conditions. 
Objective III: Improve access to services 
5. Ensure that by 2008 no-one waits more than 18 weeks from GP referral to hospital treatment. 
6. Increase the participation of problem drug users in drug treatment programmes by 100% by 
2008 and increase year on year the proportion of users successfully sustaining or completing 
treatment programmes. 
Objective IV: Improve the patient and user experience 
7. Secure sustained national improvements in NHS patient experience by 2008, as measured by 
independently validated surveys, ensuring that individuals are fully involved in decisions about their 
healthcare, including choice of provider. 
8. Improve the quality of life and independence of vulnerable older people by supporting them to 
live in their own homes where possible by: 
  increasing the proportion of older people being supported to live in their own home by 1% 
annually in 2007 and 2008; and 
  increasing by 2008, the proportion of those supported intensively to live at home to 34% of the 
total of those being supported at home or in residential care. 
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3  Po l i cy  in i t i a t i ves  and  sys tems us ing  ta rge ts  
to  improve  per fo rmance  in  the  Eng l i sh  NHS 
The most widely discussed, even notorious part of the English NHS system of 
performance improvement derived from the PSAs and related targets, were the so called 
Star ratings’ in which both provider organisations such as hospitals and mental health 
providers, and commissioning bodies (i.e. PCTs) were given an overall rating, initially by 
the Department of Health and after 2004 by an independent inspectorate, from zero to 
three stars based on their performance on a number of target measures.  Although NHS 
organisations were subject to a regime of performance measurement which included 
approximately 40 indicators arranged according to six dimensions of performance
2
, in 
practice, the star ratings for providers, 2000-2004 depended on performance on nine 
core indicators mostly related to waiting times
3
 and financial stability which were 
regarded as largely within their control.  PCTs were assessed according to the same 
waiting times targets as NHS provider organisations plus targets relating to time to see a 
GP, time to see another primary care professional, time to access drug misuse treatment 
and 4-week smoking quit rates.  Annual star ratings in the form of so called league tables 
were published from 2001 to 2005.   
The policy goal of the star ratings system was to provide the mix of managerial and 
financial incentives to performance improvement in areas of high priority to government 
and to patients which the internal market of the 1990s was regarded as having failed to 
produce.  They were also a response to a perceived deterioration of performance in 
relation to waiting times since the mid-1990s together with a number of unfavourable 
comparisons of the outcomes of care in England with continental Europe
4
.  The decision 
to compress a range of performance data into a single rating was a deliberate attempt to 
summarise complex information in the form of rankings that the public and the media 
could relate to, thereby promoting public interest, strengthening public accountability, and 
encouraging managerial and clinical action.  It was envisaged that neither managers nor 
clinicians would wish to be associated with poorly performing institutions once this was 
publicly known and would respond by trying to improve their relative position.   
The rating system was accompanied by an incentive system that was directed at holding 
the boards and, especially, the chief executives of hospitals and other organisations 
accountable for the local delivery of national priorities through the naming and shaming 
which inevitably accompanied the publication of league tables
5
.  Given that there was a 
purchaser-provider split in the English NHS, there was always the possibility that 
purchasers might attempt to redirect some of the work of providers in response to poor 
                                                                
2 The dimensions of the Performance Assessment Framework (PAF) are: population health improvement; fair access; effective 
delivery of appropriate care; efficiency; patient and carer experience; and health outcomes after treatment. 
3 There were three waiting times targets that were given particular weight: 
• Percentage of A&E patients seen within 4 hours of attendance (2003-05 target was 90% and 98% in 2005); 
• From 2002 75% of category A ambulance calls were to be responded to within 8 minutes; 
• Maximum waiting time for first elective hospital admission of 18 months in 2001, 15 months in 2002, 12 months in 2003, 9 
months in 2004 and 6 months in 2005 (3 months for outpatients). 
The current target is that by 2008, no one is to wait more than 18 weeks from GP referral to hospital treatment, less for most patients, 
and quicker still for cancers. 
4 For example, a review of cancer services followed the reporting of poorer survival of women in the NHS following treatment for breast 
cancer than in parts of continental Europe such as France and Germany.  Among other things, the review led to the setting of a target 
maximum two-week wait for referral from the GP to a cancer specialist to identify treatable cases sooner. 
5 NHS Trust boards comprise both executive directors (full-time senior managers including the chief executive and director of finance) 
and non-executives (part-time, ministerial appointees including the chair), thereby enabling the centre to hold senior managers directly 
accountable for performance alongside other members of the governance board. 
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performance ratings.  The chief executives of zero rated NHS Trusts were also at risk of 
dismissal along with their chairs.  Some of the remuneration of senior staff was potentially 
at risk if performance was poor.  On the other hand, high performing NHS Trusts were 
able to take advantage of an incentive system that focused on earned autonomy as a 
reward for success.  In addition, £155m was set aside in 2001 as a performance fund at 
provider level (not controlled by the commissioners/purchasers) to support Trust incentive 
and reward schemes.  The better the performance, the more autonomy Trusts were given 
in terms of how to spend the extra funds as well as a lower level of oversight from the 
centre.  Funds were to be spent on and by the staff who had contributed to meeting the 
performance targets.  In addition, three-star Trusts were able to apply for Foundation 
status in the first wave of this new, more autonomous form of governance of NHS provider 
organisations.  Finally, three-star Trust management teams had the opportunity to take 
over the running of failing Trusts thereby sharing their experience and expertise more 
widely and building their reputations.  Although the system of reducing more complex 
assessments of performance to a single star rating has now been abandoned in favour of 
a more complex, multi-dimensional external assessment of performance by the quality 
regulator, the Health Care Commission, the use of targets remains a central part of the 
performance improvement system in the NHS in England, now focusing increasingly on 
reducing waiting time before initial diagnosis rather than from diagnosis to treatment. 
4  The  impac t  o f  the   ta rge t   reg ime in  the  
Eng l i sh  NHS 
In general, performance improved markedly in the areas covered by English NHS 
targets.  The timing of these improvements, and the fact that they did not occur 
elsewhere in the UK, suggest that the setting of targets with related league tables and 
incentives was causally associated with a substantial part of the improvement.  
4 .1  Wai t ing t imes 
Table 1 summarises the trends in the English waiting time targets first set in 2000 and 
given high priority by Ministers and the Department of Health through the performance 
management regime.  It shows that on all the indicators performance improved markedly 
comparing the situation before the target was introduced with the years that followed.  It is 
noteworthy that performance had already begun to improve by 2002/03 before most of the 
recent growth in NHS spending and capacity began, and that similar trends are not 
observed in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland despite similar injections of funds (see 
below). 
The effect on performance of setting and focusing management effort on the A&E and 
ambulance key targets for England are shown graphically in Figures 1 and 2.  Note the 
average improvement and the narrowing of the gap between the poorest and best 
performing ambulance services in Figure 2.   
Figure 3 shows the downward trend in patients waiting more than six months for inpatient 
admission.  No one waited more than 12 months by March 2003.  Other performance data 
relating to waiting are shown in Appendix 1. 
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Table 1: Effects of the English NHS targets for waiting, 1999-2005 
Target 1999 2000 
(targets 
set) 
2001 
(first 
‘star 
ratings’) 
2002 2003 2004 2005 
90% A&E 
patients 
<4 hrs, 
2003-05 & 
98%, 2005 
   23% 
waiting 
>4 hours 
 5.3% 
waiting 
>4 hours 
 
75% 
ambulanc
e category 
A in ≤8 
mins 
 1/17 
Trusts 
met 
target 
    14/17 
met 
target 
Max wait 
for first 
elective 
admission: 
18m, 2001 
15m, 2002 
12m, 2003 
9m, 2004 
 67,000 
patients 
waiting 
>12m 
 
185,000 
waiting 
>9m 
    24 >12m 
 
 
 
41 >9m 
 
41,000 
>6m 
% on list 
waiting 
>12m 
 4.4  4.7  4.2  2.1   0  0  0 
% on list 
waiting 
>6m 
26.1 25.8 24.4 23.3 19.4 8.9 5.0 
Source:  Department of Health 
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Figure 1: Percentage of patients spending four hours or less in A&E 
 
Source:  Department of Health  (2005)  Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS.  London: Department of Health 
Figure 2 
Ambulance key target for England: 
% category A calls in 8 minutes
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Source: Gwyn Bevan, London School of Economics and Political Science, analysis of Department of Health data 
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Figure 3: Patients waiting over six months for admission 
 
Source:  Department of Health  (2005)  Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS.  London: Department of Health 
4.2 Compar ison between England and the rest  o f  the UK 
None of the other parts of the United Kingdom followed England in setting high profile, 
quantitative, time-limited targets, monitoring individual indicators, publishing overall 
league tables and operating an incentive regime of organisational and managerial 
rewards and sanctions applying both to commissioners and providers of services.  Indeed, 
after political responsibility for the NHS was devolved to Wales and Scotland in 1998, 
targets were abandoned.  For example, in Wales, while the separation between purchase 
and provision remained, waiting time targets were removed and policy focused instead on 
cooperative working between health, local government and the voluntary sector to 
improve community health.  In Scotland, the 1990s quasi-market was abolished, there 
were no English-style targets and steps taken to build a professionally led, integrated 
system based on concepts such as the managed clinical network.   As a result, there has 
been a natural experiment into the effect of targets in the context of a quasi-market 
(England) versus no targets in the context of a more collaborative, network-based system 
(Scotland and Wales).   In fact, England also came to experiment with clinically led 
networks (so called collaboratives) in order to improve performance in particular areas 
such as cancer (see below).  Thus the English approach was a hybrid with elements of 
hierarchical, market and network governance. 
The most striking difference in the performance of the NHS across the four countries of 
the UK comparing 1996 with 2003 (when targets dominated in England) was the reported 
reductions in waiting in England which did not occur elsewhere despite similar funding 
increases in the other countries of the UK and which seemed to be the result of strong 
performance management against targets (Alvarez-Roseté, Bevan, Mays and Dixon, 
2005).  The bar chart below (Figure 4) shows the percentage waiting more than 12 
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months in England and Wales between 2000 and 2003.  The percentage rose in Wales 
while waits of more than a year virtually disappeared in England.   
Hauck and Street (2004) compared the performance of hospitals on either side of the 
England-Wales border over a six-year period before and after devolution.  They showed 
that the English hospitals recorded increased levels of activity, undertook proportionately 
more day case activity and had declining mortality rates while activity levels remained 
constant in Wales, the proportion of day cases fell and mortality rates rose.  English 
patients waited less time and were more likely to be treated within the target waiting 
period. 
Figure 4 
Acute key target: % waiting 
(admission) > 12 months
0
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Source: Gwyn Bevan, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
Table 2 gives the comparative trends for 6-month and 12-months waits in England, Wales 
and Northern Ireland (unfortunately, Scottish waiting time statistics are not comparable 
with the rest of the UK).  It shows deterioration in Wales and Northern Ireland, 1999-2001, 
when Englands performance was improving markedly followed by some signs of a catch-
up as pressure mounted to emulate trends in England.  For example, latterly the NHS in 
Wales has given much more attention to reducing long waits with considerable success. 
  
W P  0 6 / 0 6  |  
 
U s e  o f  T a r g e t s  t o  I m p r o v e  H e a l t h  S y s t e m  P e r f o r m a n c e :   E n g l i s h  
N H S  E x p e r i e n c e  a n d  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  N e w  Z e a l a n d  
 
1 1
 
Table 2: Percentage of patients on NHS hospital waiting lists waiting longer than 6 
or 12 months, 1999-2005 
 
Source: Bevan G, Hood C.  Have targets improved performance in the English NHS?  BMJ 2006; 332: 419-22 
4.3 Trends in  t reatment  outcomes 
Targets were set in England to reduce death rates from cancers, circulatory disease and 
intentional self-harm from the levels when the Labour government took power in 1997.  
Although analysis of trends cannot prove causality, the focus on these three areas 
appears to have been associated with noticeable improvements in mortality (see Figures 
5-7).  In the period after targets were set, premature deaths from cancers and coronary 
heart disease fell faster in England than in any other European country, though admittedly 
from a high base.  For example, the cancer death rate for people under 75 years fell by 
over 12% between 1999 and 2003.  The cancer target has been associated with a range 
of efforts to map and reorganise the patient pathway through the cancer system both at a 
regional level and within individual parts of the cancer service (e.g. speeding up non-
urgent waits for screening by setting up clinics led by specialist nurses or nurse-led 
endoscopy clinics for urgent referrals).  This so called modernisation of service delivery 
and organisation was given greater urgency by the existence of clinical targets.  There 
was also a large increase in the number of cancer specialists (approximately 38% 
between 1997 and 2005) precipitated by the requirement to meet the cancer target.   
In the case of coronary heart disease there was a 43% increase in revascularisations with 
much shorter waits from referral to treatment and a 227% increase in the prescription of 
lipid lowering medications between the publication of the NHS Plan in 1999/2000 and 
2004/05.  In the mental health field, the suicide rate fell 6% between the baseline rate 
(1995-97 average) and 2001-03 average (see Figure 7).  This was accompanied by a 
large increase in spending, staff and access to new treatments, but, again, the initial 
significant improvements predated the large increases in the NHS budget from 2002/03. 
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Figure 5: Progress against cancer mortality target 
 
Source:  Department of Health  (2005)  Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS.  London: Department of Health 
In Scotland, clinical performance data were published in the 1990s, but without external 
quality assurance of the data and without the incentives and external scrutiny put in place 
in England.  It was expected that providers and clinicians would use the data to stimulate 
further investigation into causes of performance variation and act accordingly.  The 
initiative had no discernible effect on performance (Mannion and Goddard, 2001). 
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Figure 6: Progress against circulatory disease mortality target 
 
Source:  Department of Health  (2005)  Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS.  London: Department of Health 
The markedly superior performance in England on those indicators which were the subject 
of English targets did not mean that England was the best performer on all the aspects of 
performance which it is possible to measure comparably across the UK.  For example, 
Scotland had the highest rates of breast cancer screening coverage of women aged 50-64 
(2002), influenza vaccination for over 65s (2004) and MMR vaccination coverage of 2 year 
olds (2001) of the four countries.  Wales had the highest rates of statin prescribing.   
However, England had the lowest all-cause mortality, and specifically, the lowest mortality 
from colorectal cancer and coronary heart disease.   
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Figure 7: Progress against mental health target 
 
Source:  Department of Health  (2005) Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS.  London: Department of Health 
In addition, there was no obvious sign in the non-target areas that performance in England 
was being harmed by efforts to raise performance in target areas despite the fact that per 
capita expenditure was substantially lower in England than in other parts of the UK 
(Alvarez-Roseté, Bevan, Mays and Dixon, 2005).  It is, however, possible that the policies 
and approaches to performance improvement of the other parts of the UK may take longer 
to produce their benefits and that these gains could become apparent in the future. 
5  Cr i t i c i sms o f  the  use  o f  ta rge ts  and  s ta r  
ra t ings  in  the  Eng l i sh  NHS 
Despite the improvements in performance in areas which were the subject of targets and 
related incentives, which was not matched elsewhere in the UK, targets, and particularly, 
star ratings, have been criticised, principally for being crude and leading to perverse 
consequences.  Many of the criticisms, though expressed in a variety of ways, amount to 
an argument against the priorities which the targets represented.  Some of the criticisms 
related to the specific way in which the achievement of targets was used to produce 
overall star ratings together with the sanctions and rewards that followed different ratings.  
Other criticisms were intrinsic to target regimes in general. 
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5 .1  There were too many targets  
It is undoubtedly true that there were a large number of targets potentially contributing to 
the star rating system.  Efforts have been made since the early 2000s to reduce their 
number.  It was also apparent that a much smaller number of targets, mostly related to the 
responsiveness of services, dominated the eventual calculation of star ratings.  This 
criticism is not intrinsic to the use of targets, though there is a general tendency for the 
number of targets to grow over time unless carefully managed. 
5 .2  Targets  were too r ig id  and undermined s ta f f  mora le  
These criticisms related to the fact that targets did not take into account local variations in 
factors such as the incidence of disease (size of the problem), deprivation (difficulty of 
implementing a response) or the fact that different places may have different local 
problems.  This was principally because the most important targets initially related to 
process improvements (i.e. shorter waits) which were regarded by the Department of 
Health as directly under the control of the NHS irrespective population characteristics.  
The concern about staff morale relates to the general risk that too much emphasis on 
externally driven targets may drive out intrinsic motivation, particularly among professional 
staff.  This reinforces the point above about keeping the number of targets under control. 
This set of criticisms has to be taken seriously.  It challenges those setting targets to set 
realistic targets in areas that local health services can influence, consult front-line staff 
and service users on these, and be prepared to refine targets in light of experience.  
However, in tax-financed systems, final authority (and responsibility, arguably) for setting 
targets should rest with central government, despite the fact that it is tempting to allow 
influential professionals to set them (Collins, Sibson, Shotas, Smith and Thornton, 2005).  
While local managers and clinicians will need more detailed performance and other 
information for running services, this should be seen as quite distinct from national 
targets. 
5 .3  Targets  had perverse and un in tended consequences 
This set of criticisms has been widely debated and is true in the sense that participants in 
systems may, depending on motivation, try to find ways of minimising their need to 
change in order to meet performance improvement targets.   There was evidence of 
perverse effects in the English NHS case (e.g. GPs receptionists refusing to allow 
patients to book appointments more than 48 hours ahead, even when it suited them, on 
the basis that this would count against the practice hitting the maximum 48-hour wait 
target.  The basis of measurement was subsequently altered to exclude appointments 
more than 48 hours ahead where the patient had requested this).   There were reports of 
hospitals reducing the number of patients on waiting lists and driving down average waits 
by preferentially treating easier patients at the expense of more complex patients who 
might have had to wait longer as a result (Chang, 2006). 
The force of this set of criticisms can be reduced with greater transparency about why a 
particular target had been set and measuring performance in ways that relate to the 
underlying rationale for the target.  As Collins et al (2005) point out, there is no intrinsic 
reason why a target should distort priorities since, by definition, a target indicates a 
priority.  Seen from this perspective, many criticisms of the distorting effects of targets 
are, in fact, criticisms of the priorities themselves and of the fact that they focused 
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managerial and clinical attention on particular areas (e.g. cancer treatment) and/or facets 
of performance (e.g. waiting) rather than others.  For instance, in England the 
governments school students literacy targets were criticised for narrowing the 
curriculum and driving out other educational activities, but if literacy cannot be taught 
acceptably within a broad curriculum, arguably the curriculum has to be narrowed as long 
as literacy is regarded as an important outcome of schooling.  In the NHS, there was 
criticism that excessive emphasis on reducing waiting times was leading hospital 
departments to treat patients according to the length of time they had waited irrespective 
of clinical priority or, as mentioned above, in relation to ease of treatment, and that some 
patients health was suffering accordingly.  Again, this was a criticism of the relative 
priority given to average waiting time over other measures of performance in the elective 
area such as the ability to prioritise patients on the waiting list. 
5 .4  Fa i lures o f  per formance outs ide target  areas were 
t reated as i f  they d id  not  mat ter  
This criticism is a specific manifestation of the general concern about distortion and 
unanticipated, undesirable consequences.  It focuses on the signals sent out if some 
areas are the subject of targets and others not (e.g. if one area is subject of a target 
because it is measurable and another not because it is intangible, but is arguably of equal 
value), and the fact that under the star rating system it was possible for a provider to 
harm performance in one area in order to hit a target since the star rating was an 
average of performance across a range of indicators.   While it is inevitable that targets 
will indicate that certain aspects of performance are of higher priority than others, they do 
not have to imply that non-target areas of performance are of no importance.  A target 
regime should be accompanied by monitoring of performance across a far wider range of 
areas. 
5 .5  I t  was not  a lways c lear  who was respons ib le  for  
meet ing targets  
This criticism particularly relates to targets which apply to more than one department or 
agency.  It is now generally accepted that one department or agency should be required 
to take lead responsibility for delivery of a joint target, perhaps by being given an overall 
budget for its delivery and contracting other agencies to help so that the responsibility can 
be sub-divided when drawing up implementation plans.  This was not an especially 
important criticism of the NHS target regime since the initial targets related in the main, 
though not exclusively, to activities under the potential control of different NHS bodies 
(e.g. waiting times for specific types of services such as A&E).  On the other hand, other 
targets, such as the target relating to reducing deaths from heart disease and stroke (see 
Box 2), apply to both primary care and hospital providers. 
5 .6  Targets  d id  not  a lways take in to  account  factors  
a f fect ing per formance outs ide the cont ro l  o f  NHS 
organisat ions  
A range of variables may influence measured levels of performance outside the control of 
the assessed organisation such as differences in the characteristics of the population 
served, geography and random variations.  Other constraints may be controllable, but only 
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in the longer term, such as the capital stock of a hospital.  Funding formulae such as 
those used in New Zealand and England attempt to compensate health entities for 
environmental circumstances, but are inevitably imperfect.  There is evidence that the star 
ratings and key performance targets set for English PCTs and providers did not allow 
adequately for different environmental circumstances, suggesting caution in using targets 
without adjustment (Jacobs, Martin, Goddard, Gravelle and Smith, 2006).  This is another 
argument for exercising judgement when using the results achieved by organisations to 
determine rewards and sanctions. 
5 .7  The data on which targets  were based were not  
cred ib le  
Collins et al (2005) argue that this is the biggest single problem with targets in the UK 
public service context and relates to the measurability of targets, the quality of the data 
used and the vulnerability of the data to manipulation (another perverse consequence).  
Measurability per se was less of a problem in the English NHS than it might have been 
since, not surprisingly, the initial set of highly incentivised targets tended to be set in areas 
where established data systems were available (to the extent that the government was 
also criticised for focusing excessively on those aspects of NHS performance that were 
easily measurable at the expensive of other, potentially equally important aspects of 
performance!).  However, this does not exclude the possibility that a part of the 
improvement observed was simply a result of changes in the way that data were recorded 
and reported (e.g. that the reductions in four-hour waits in A&E were largely artefacts of 
finding smart ways of diverting patients from the A&E department or that improvements 
in waiting times for elective surgery were the result of culling low priority patients from 
waiting lists or not accepting as many patients onto the waiting list in the first place).  It 
seems at least possible that part of the reported improvement in waiting times, if not in 
survival, was due to changes in reporting which did not occur in Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland because the pressure to reach targets was absent.  However, other 
pieces of evidence indicate that the improvements reported were also genuine.  For 
instance, numbers of elective operations carried out increased markedly in the period.  In 
addition, there was no systematic approach to determining waiting list priorities (unlike in 
New Zealand under the surgical booking system) in the English system (i.e. all patients on 
the waiting list were, in theory, regarded as being equally worth treating since the problem 
of managing elective treatment was defined by government as a problem of delay and 
insufficient capacity rather than one of inadequate prioritisation), thereby reducing the 
scope for using prioritisation to remove patients from waiting lists.   
One overarching response to this group of criticisms is to put in place an independent 
agency, as in Canada, to supervise measurement issues (e.g. to prevent accusations of 
government or individual organisations cooking the books), to develop better data 
collection systems and to compile performance reports. 
5 .8  The degree of  sanct ion or  reward was not  c lear ly  
re la ted to  the degree of  fa i lure  or  success 
It was argued that organisations could be assigned a zero star rating with major 
consequences through missing just one target even if their performance in other respects 
was exemplary and that the system allowed no discretion to take this into account.  
Clearly any system in which performance against targets is strongly incentivised needs to 
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allow some discretion.  Sanctions and rewards need to be proportionate to the degree and 
extent of any failures or success, not simply to a particular score. 
5 .9  The cent re   cou ld  not  adequate ly  determine what  
mat tered most  
This criticism relates to the criticism of rigidity, above, and is based on the observation 
that local circumstances vary, what matters most will vary and that the centre cannot 
know sufficiently well to determine a set of national targets that apply always and 
everywhere.  For instance, given the differences in social and ethnic composition of the 
population in different parts of the country, it was possible that the most important causes 
of avoidable death or morbidity were sufficiently different that a national target to reduce 
cancer death rates was far less pressing and appropriate in some parts of the country 
than in others.  Again, this criticism highlights the importance of restricting the number of 
targets, confining them to major performance issues and/or focusing on higher level 
outcomes.  However, in nationally funded and accountable systems such as tax financed 
public health systems, central government has a right and a duty to set accountable 
targets for peripheral agencies which may not be uniformly accepted by these agencies.  
This does not preclude the setting of local, accountable targets (see below for more on 
this).  Another response to this criticism is to set, monitor and assess performance against 
targets in terms of changes in indicators rather than solely on the attainment of an 
absolute level of performance. 
5 .10 The gaming  and other  negat ive responses could  
wel l  have overr idden the benef i ts  o f  hav ing 
accountab le  targets  
This criticism is ultimately empirical, though difficult to verify
6
.  It is conceivable that any 
neglect of non-targeted areas could have reduced service quality sufficiently to offset any 
benefits accruing in the targeted areas.  In addition, there were reports of perverse 
behaviour (e.g. refusing to deal with low risk patients at A&E departments at peak times 
until the four-hour waiting target could be met), responses which had no obvious health 
care benefit but helped with meeting a target (e.g. employing nurses simply to greet 
patients at A&E departments to ensure that all arriving patients were seen within five 
minutes of arrival) and fraud (e.g. manipulation of waiting lists and waiting time statistics).  
On the other hand, in the English NHS, targets were modified in light of evidence of 
inappropriate responses to try to mitigate their impact.  Thus the target that all patients 
should be able to book an appointment with their GP within 48 hours was amended to 
reflect the fact that some patients wished to book appointments further in the future but 
were being prevented from doing so by practices anxious to hit the target because of the 
financial consequences.  One way to mitigate gaming and other dysfunctional behaviours 
is to have performance data independently audited (see above).  Despite the problems it 
generated, experts on performance management tend to conclude that the target regime 
was a net improvement over the previous arrangements in the NHS (see below). 
                                                                
6 Many of the reports of adverse effects were anecdotal, but some have been credibly documented, for instance, by the House of 
Commons Public Administration Select Committee (2003) 
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6  S t reng ths  and  weaknesses  o f  the  sys tem o f  
 ta rge ts   and   s ta r  ra t ings   
Like any policy instrument, the preceding discussion and analysis shows that the use of 
incentivised targets has both strengths and weaknesses.  In this sense targets are no 
different from the other policy instruments available (i.e. variants on exhortation, choice 
(markets), voice (community governance) and targets).  Table 3, below, summarises the 
strengths and weaknesses of the English experience with targets. 
Table 3: Strengths and weaknesses of 'targets' and 'star ratings' 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Relatively simple, clear targets with strong 
financial incentives improved performance, 
especially in relation to waiting times.  These 
gains were not seen in other parts of the UK 
where specific targets were not set and where 
performance continued to deteriorate 
Managers focused on targets contributing to 
star ratings rather than on areas that might 
have been more important for overall health 
system performance (e.g. a focus on meeting 
the target of a 2-week maximum wait for 
suspected cancers risked crowding out follow-
up visits) 
Progress in England eventually put pressure 
on other parts of the UK to emulate England 
 
Targets covered aspects of performance that 
were of great importance to patients (e.g. 
trolley waits in A&E for inpatient admission) 
Targets potentially neglected important areas 
since they were limited by available data to 
what could be measured easily (e.g. a relative 
paucity of data on clinical quality versus 
waiting times) 
Some targets related to quality of care (e.g. 
emergency re-admissions) and not just to 
issues of responsiveness 
 
It was possible to mitigate expected 
dysfunctional consequences (e.g. by 
modifying targets) 
Targets produced a range of dysfunctional 
responses 
 Targets and related incentives risked crowding 
out intrinsic motivation to do well 
 
Advising caution in the use of targets and performance indicators, Carter, Klein and Day 
(1995) point out that most performance indicators are just that  indicators  rather than 
definitive measures of performance.  They argue that most performance indicators are tin 
openers rather than dials  that is, they do not give definitive answers to questions of 
performance, but prompt further investigation.  By themselves, such indicators inevitably 
provide an incomplete and inaccurate picture of performance as a whole.  Yet the English 
NHS targets were never designed to cover a representative range of areas of 
performance.  Instead, there is little doubt that the adoption and pursuit of a small number 
of targets in the English NHS improved performance in the areas of focus which were 
regarded politically as being of over-riding importance.  Nevertheless, in order to hit some 
targets, systems may have to be restructured in ways that brought benefits beyond the 
specific target (e.g. anecdotally, in order to reduce waiting times in A&E departments, it 
was necessary to change the way in which entire departments operated with attendant 
gains in the quality of care).  Rather than prompting the abandonment of performance 
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indicators and targets, Carter et als observations underline the importance of careful 
selection of target areas while maintaining a system of monitoring of other areas of 
performance.   
Sheila Leatherman, a leading quality improvement expert with experience of both the UK 
and the US, argues, on the basis of a review of trends in performance in the two countries 
from the late 1990s, that the First Fallacy of performance improvement in health systems 
is to claim that performance targets and indicators do not work (Leatherman, 2005).  Le 
Grand (2004) agrees, but argues that the sort of target and incentive regime adopted in 
the English NHS was generally only likely to be effective in meeting relatively unequivocal 
performance goals which could be adequately measured by simple indicators (e.g. waiting 
times).  He also argues that such a regime was only likely to work well over a relatively 
short period of time.  As time wears on, the odds of gaming responses and harm to 
morale would be likely to increase.  This suggests that strongly incentivised targets should 
probably be used sparingly as part of a range of different instruments to improve 
performance.  Le Grands concerns about the long-term viability of targets also relate to 
his preference for strengthening user choice and competition as drivers of performance 
improvement in the English NHS over the use of hierarchical managerial targets. 
Despite the acknowledged weaknesses of the target regime, the overall verdict of analysts 
has tended to be positive.  For example, Bevan and Hood (2006, p421) conclude their 
review of the impact of NHS targets as follows: 
Nobody would want to return to the NHS performance before the introduction of 
targets, with over 20% of patients spending more than four hours in accident and 
emergency and patients waiting more than 18 months for elective admission.  And 
attempts to improve performance without a star system in Wales were criticised by 
the auditor general for Wales for having provided neither strong incentives nor 
sanctions to improve waiting time performance and were widely perceived to have 
rewarded organisations that failed to deliver on waiting times. 
This broad view is shared by the members of a recent independent commission into the 
use of targets in the public services: 
Targets can and should be defended.  They ought not, in our view, to be 
abandoned.  They are useful for a government to ensure that public money is spent 
well.  Used well, targets provide organisational focus, embody the ambitions of 
government and offer a transparent account by which services can be measured. 
(Collins et al, 2005, p1) 
From this perspective, the policy challenge is thus how to maximise the social benefits 
and minimise the costs of a regime of targets and incentives rather than abandoning the 
entire approach. 
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7  Learn ing  f rom the  Eng l i sh  NHS exper ience  
w i th  ta rge ts  
Drawing together recent commentary and analysis of the UK experience with the use of 
targets linked to managerial incentives in public services in general and the English NHS 
more specifically (e.g. Collins et al, 2005), a number of lessons can be distilled with 
relevance to New Zealand, as follows: 
1 Targets with linked incentives add most value where other mechanisms such as 
user choice (exit or the threat of exit), competition between providers for 
purchasers contracts, or voice are likely to be infeasible or blunt tools
7
.  
2 Targets and incentives, as in the English NHS, are likely to be most effective in 
meeting relatively unequivocal performance goals which can be adequately 
measured by simple indicators (e.g. waiting times) (Le Grand, 2004).  Thus targets 
should be easily measurable and specify an effect over a defined period of time; 
i.e. an x% reduction in y over time period y.  Targets should allow for uncertainty 
(i.e. random variation).  Both outcome and process targets can be valuable as long 
as in the case of the latter there is a strong link between change in the process 
and the likelihood of achieving a desired policy outcome.  If measurement is 
intractable, then targets are unlikely to be the correct instrument for performance 
improvement and, instead, performance should be monitored using a wide range 
of qualitative and quantitative evidence to provide warning of inadequate levels of 
performance. 
3 Both outcome and process targets can be valuable as long as, in the case of the 
latter, there is a strong link between change in the process and the likelihood of 
achieving a desired policy outcome. 
4 Targets should be few in number because they should only be set for aspects of 
services that are exceptionally important and where there is a consensus that 
change is needed
8
. Targets are best used where there is evidence of service 
failure, unacceptable levels of performance, new higher performance standards or 
a consensus that a service needs to be delivered in a radically new way
9
. 
5 Targets should not be used to maintain the status quo (e.g. after an initial target 
has been attained), but should be seen as dynamic (i.e. once they have been 
reached, they should be removed and replaced with monitoring).  Le Grand (2004) 
also argues that targets are likely to work best in an area over relatively short 
period of time.  As time wears on, the odds of gaming responses and harm to 
morale are likely to increase.  This suggests that strongly incentivised targets 
should probably be used sparingly for a specific period as part of a range of 
different instruments to improve performance. 
                                                                
7 Targets were used in the English NHS alongside a range of different tools such as collaboratives, regionalisation of services and 
investment in increased capacity, and, latterly, a range of market-related instruments such as patient choice and public-private 
competition to deliver services. 
8 Targets should not be seen as substituting for the entire range of priorities of the health system, but should focus on what is currently 
deemed most important. 
9 Given the dynamics of health systems, it would seem prudent to set hard-edged targets in areas where professionals, managers and 
the public broadly agree that there are problems that need attention. 
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6 Targets should have a single, specific objective that is reasonably (not necessarily 
entirely) within the power of the relevant institution to influence.  It should be clear 
to which agency or agencies the target relates.  Where a performance target 
relates to more than one agency, joint targets can be set as long as it is clear 
which agency has lead responsibility (and possibly control of the overall budget 
for meeting the target). 
7 Target selection and the relative weight given to different targets in performance 
management is always a political process and requires political leadership.  In a 
tax-financed system, it is entirely appropriate that central government ultimately 
determines the pattern of targets since it is accountable for the resources deployed 
on behalf of the public. 
8 Targets do not have to be quantitatively weighted and aggregated into a single 
measure of performance (e.g. a star rating or index of efficiency) to be useful for 
performance management
10
.  Compound measures of performance are more likely 
to be valid and helpful in relation to public utilities rather than more complex fields 
such as health care (Smith and Street, 2005) though they do focus public and 
media attention on performance issues and sharpen underlying incentives.  Index 
measures can be misleading and encourage gaming. 
9 Targets should be related to sanctions and rewards, but these must be 
proportionate to the service improvement or lack of improvement, and sensitively 
implemented (e.g. it makes no sense to sanction a manager for narrowly missing a 
performance target if substantial service improvement has nonetheless been 
demonstrated).  Sanctions and rewards should not be used to signal the relative 
importance of individual targets since this encourages perverse behaviour.  No 
one should be dismissed for missing a single target given that targets can only 
relate to specific aspects of performance, by definition, and there are likely to be 
grey areas where performance is not entirely under the control of a specific 
organisation.  Instead, sanctions and rewards should relate to overall performance 
in target areas even if performance is not measured through a single index since 
there will be inevitable uncertainties associated with the values recorded on 
individual measures. 
10 Targets must be an integral part of any performance management, audit or 
inspection regime and should not be confused with other approaches to 
performance improvement such as peer benchmarking. 
11 In tax financed systems, targets should be national except where it is evident that 
specific institutions or geographic areas have particular problems where it may be 
appropriate to agree local targets drawn from a domain of national priority areas or 
to quantify national targets differently (e.g. lower the percentage improvement 
required within a specific time for those institutions which are likely to face the 
greatest challenge in improving performance) (Bevan, 2006).  Another approach is 
to set general targets at national level with successively more detailed targets 
below national level.  The risk with this is that the national targets could become 
vague, thereby weakening accountability. 
                                                                
10 The decision in the English NHS to produce an overall ‘score’ for each provider and purchaser organisation was designed to focus 
senior management and governance board attention of performance issues since it allowed the centre to publish ‘league tables’ of 
individual indicators and overall ‘scores’ which were picked up by the media.  An effective target regime can be established without 
generating simple, single number scores for institutions or services.  Index measures suffer from the difficulty of deciding which 
indicators to include and what weight to give to each. 
  
W P  0 6 / 0 6  |  
 
U s e  o f  T a r g e t s  t o  I m p r o v e  H e a l t h  S y s t e m  P e r f o r m a n c e :   E n g l i s h  
N H S  E x p e r i e n c e  a n d  I m p l i c a t i o n s  f o r  N e w  Z e a l a n d  
 
2 3
 
12 Targets backed up by incentives will generate some undesirable behaviours and 
effects.  These should be expected rather than seen as a fundamental threat to the 
policy and plans should be put in place as soon as possible to mitigate or eliminate 
them (e.g. by altering the way target performance is measured).  Bevan and Hood 
(2006) suggest two other ways to reduce the odds of significant gaming: 
independent auditing and reporting of performance data; and the introduction of 
some uncertainty into the assessment of performance to reduce the odds of 
certain kinds of managerial gaming (e.g. managers temporarily putting extra staff 
to work in a particular area when it is known that performance data are to be 
collected).  They raise the intriguing possibility of varying the range of targets and 
other performance indicators used to assess an institutions performance each 
year (Bevan and Hood, 2004).  They give as an analogy the relationship between 
the syllabus of a course and the topics from the syllabus covered in the related 
unseen examination, designed to reduce strategic behaviour by students. 
8  Imp l i ca t ions  o f  the  Eng l i sh  NHS exper ience  
fo r  New Zea land s  pub l i c  hea l th  sys tem 
The system of targets (i.e. performance goals backed up by a strong incentive regime) in 
the English NHS was one strand in what Leatherman and Sutherland (2003) have 
described as, The most ambitious, comprehensive and intentionally funded national 
initiative to improve health care quality in the world.   This initiative embraced a wide 
range of different approaches to improving performance in line with what is known about 
improvement in health care organisations.  As Ham (2003, p1978) puts it: 
Accepting that influences on clinical practice are many and varied, no one approach 
to improvement of performance is likely to be sufficient. Rather, several interventions 
are needed, including educational initiatives, use of opinion leaders, peer-review 
mechanisms, and financial and other incentives. 
While New Zealand uses many of the same approaches, there has been no comparable 
use of targets linked to incentives in New Zealand despite the similarities between the two 
public health systems in terms of central government funding, strategic objectives and 
organisational accountability.  Though the New Zealand Health Strategy and related 
Strategies set a large number of objectives these tend to be aspirational, and are usually 
not quantified or time-limited.  Thus the objectives are set out in the Strategy in terms of: 
• reducing smoking 
• improving nutrition 
• reducing obesity 
• increasing the level of physical activity 
• reducing the rate of suicides and suicide attempts 
• minimising harm caused by alcohol and illicit and other drug use to individuals and 
the community 
• reducing the incidence and impact of cancer 
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• reducing the incidence and impact of cardiovascular disease 
• reducing the incidence and impact of diabetes 
• improving oral health 
• reducing violence in interpersonal relationships, families, schools and communities 
• improving the health status of people with severe mental illness 
• ensuring access to appropriate child health care services including well child and 
family health care and immunisation. 
However, these objectives are not formal targets backed up by performance-related 
consequences.  What are described as targets exist in some areas, but these are not 
linked to managerial incentives so are not strictly targets in the sense described here.  
Performance league tables are not published.   
The evidence presented above of the positive effect of targets in the English NHS 
suggests that there is at least a case for considering some use of targets in the New 
Zealand public health system in a small number of areas where there is a reasonable 
consensus that current performance can and should be improved, and that appropriate 
targets can be set and validly measured.  This is not to say that the system should rely 
exclusively on such targets to generate improvements in performance.  Targets should 
be seen as one among a range of approaches. 
However, there are a number of issues in relation to the sparing use of targets which 
would have to be taken into account in designing an effective system of targets and 
incentives.  Some of these issues relate to the differences between the New Zealand 
public health system and the English NHS, others are generic to the use of performance 
targets with associated incentives.  On the generic side, in addition to possible adverse 
side-effects such as some distorted behaviour, ineffective responses and fraud, and the 
need to put in place countervailing measures if targets are linked to relatively high 
powered incentives, there is the risk that a target regime may reduce the internal 
motivation of professional staff (Smith, 2005).  The costs of heavy reliance on external 
motivation through targets may be considerable although much depends on the degree 
to which the relevant professionals agree or can be persuaded of the importance of 
pursuing the particular targets (e.g. it has been argued that one reason why waiting times 
were relatively neglected as a policy issue in the NHS was that clinicians were much less 
affected by their consequences than patients and so less concerned to shorten them than 
they were motivated to improve other aspects of their services such as improving the 
quality of care for those treated, but that the government succeeded in convincing a 
significant proportion of the professionals that the future of the NHS depended on 
drastically improving its responsiveness).   
This tends to suggest that national targets should be used sparingly and that, as far as is 
consistent with government responsibility and accountability for the use of large amounts 
of taxpayers resources, they should engage the interest and commitment of health 
professionals as well as being directed at managers (arguably, the English regime was 
mostly (perhaps excessively) directed at incentivising managers).  In this regard, the 
English experience in the cancer field is instructive in that the impetus for service change 
came from setting improvement targets (e.g. that no patient should wait more than two 
weeks to see a specialist when referred by their GP with suspected cancer) through a 
relatively top-down problem identification process, but the changes in response 
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(modernisation) were developed and implemented through regional collaboratives or 
networks of organisations and professionals involved in all aspects of cancer screening, 
diagnosis, treatment and care.  This process was led from the centre by the appointment 
of a so called cancer tsar (the NHS National Cancer Director), Prof Mike Richards, a 
medical oncologist.  In this way, a balance was struck, at least in the cancer field, 
between top-down external scrutiny and accountability (through tracking progress 
towards targets in terms of post-treatment cancer mortality rates), and reliance on more 
bottom-up professionally led change (through staff themselves reconfiguring services 
and referral processes).   
In general, it is likely that local clinicians will have interests and priorities for their services 
which differ appreciably from central governments systemic targets (Chang 2006) unless 
efforts are made to convince the relevant clinical communities of interest of the 
importance of the targeted area in terms that they can relate to.  This does not necessarily 
involve accepting professionals definitions of problems and priorities (given the gains that 
can be made by the use of targets), but it does involve recognising that the lower the 
degree of fit between government targets for the system and the internal goals of 
professional providers, the greater the likelihood of organisational resistance to externally 
imposed requirements (Oliver, 1991).  Broadly, clinicians in the relevant areas have to 
believe that meeting the target will benefit their patients without imposing excessive costs 
on the clinical community. 
In designing targets and incentives, there are also the questions of how to set the 
standard embodied in any target and what to reward/penalise.  Should targets be set in 
terms of raising average performance across a group of institutions, or should they be 
based on an expected level of improvement in performance irrespective of the starting 
point, or should they relate to how far from a specified standard or the group average an 
institution starts (i.e. so that improvement from a low base might count for more than the 
same improvement from a higher level of performance)?  Further, should targets apply to 
all institutions or only to those performing below a specified level?  Answers to these 
questions depend, in part, on the overriding goal of the target regime  whether it is to 
raise the average level of performance irrespective of which institutions contribute, or 
whether it is to raise the average by raising performance at the bottom end of the 
distribution, or whether it is to narrow the variation in performance while improving the 
average.   
Evidence indicates that targets should be set, or at least rewarded, generally in terms of 
improvements in performance rather than the attainment of a particular level, since the 
latter tends to signal to average and above-average performers that they have nothing to 
accomplish and only sends out strong incentives to poor performers.  In addition, a focus 
on improvement does not disadvantage organisations (in this case, District Health Boards 
(DHBs) and Primary Health Organisations (PHOs)) which serve more deprived or higher 
need populations since they will be rewarded for improvement irrespective of where they 
start from.  This approach also means that it is less critical than it would otherwise be to 
be able to adjust any performance measures exactly to take into account differences 
between the populations of DHBs or PHOs.  However, there may be situations where 
targets embodying an absolute standard are preferable (e.g. where performance below a 
particular level is widely regarded as unacceptable and the focus is on improving the 
performance of those who fall below the standard irrespective of where they start from 
and irrespective of the characteristics of their population served). 
In the context of a much smaller health system than the English NHS, with only 21 DHBs 
(though 81 PHOs), separating real variations in performance from apparent variations 
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attributable to small numbers of events will be important in order to maintain the credibility 
of the approach.  Any variations in performance which attract sanctions and rewards have 
to be valid (e.g. calculated on the basis of moving averages over a number of years 
and/or presenting 95% confidence intervals around any point estimates). 
Another important design issue is to set targets that are within the scope of the relevant 
agency or agencies to influence if not entirely remedy.  For example, while a health 
problem may be a major contributor to the burden of disease, it may not be amenable to 
action on the part of the health sector or there may not be adequate knowledge of how the 
health system can best respond.  It would be important, particularly at the beginning of the 
process not to set strongly incentivised targets which risk undermining confidence in the 
approach. 
Other issues which have to be determined in developing a system of incentivised targets 
include what rewards/sanctions attach to good/poor performance (and/or little or no 
improvement in performance), whether or not there should be any local as against 
national targets, and whether or not progress should be measured by an organisation 
other than the organisation which sets the targets.  Of these, the most sensitive is the 
choice of financial and non-financial rewards and sanctions facing DHBs and other health 
sector organisations.  At present, little use is made of either financial or non-financial 
rewards and sanctions, yet it is well known that simply collating and monitoring 
performance information is unlikely to produce substantial performance improvement 
unless supported by incentives.  The only financial reward available to DHBs currently is 
advance payment on a monthly basis from the Ministry of Health to those DHBs that are 
performing well financially.  It is possible that a similar advance payment could be made 
available to DHBs that make non-financial performance improvements in target areas.  
However, this is a very limited reward, particularly given that it would offer nothing to those 
DHBs that are already performing well financially.   
Another possibility in the New Zealand context, where equity of funding and access to 
services between DHBs are high priorities (as they are in England), might be to offer high 
performers a share in a staff development fund.  However, the vertical integration of 
planning and funding with hospital provision in the DHB model makes it more difficult than 
in the English NHS to reward providers versus purchasers for their contribution to 
performance improvements since publicly owned providers are part of the DHB.  There is 
some scope to use peer and public recognition as an incentive if performance trends are 
publicly reported.  Again, the ability to do this is reduced in the New Zealand context by 
the fact that purchase and provision of hospital and public health services are the 
responsibility of the same organisation making it less likely that a DHB could or would use 
provider performance data to alter its pattern of purchasing.  Similarly, many DHB 
hospitals (if not other service providers) are local monopolies further reducing (but not 
necessarily eliminating) the ability of the centre to use comparative performance 
assessment to encourage performance improvement. 
There is also the question of whether there should be any external assessment of why 
performance of an institution or area is poor in order to be able to offer advice versus 
leaving this entirely to local initiative.  In the English NHS, the NHS Modernisation Agency 
developed to provide a management consultancy service separate from the Department 
of Health to work alongside local providers to help them with problem identification, 
development of solutions and implementation in order to meet targets (among other 
performance issues identified at local level).  The Agency also publicised case studies of 
improvement so that other NHS organisations could benefit from the achievements of 
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leaders in the field.  It is possible that the Ministry of Health could contribute in this way 
since it is unlikely that a separate agency could be justified in the New Zealand context. 
9  Conc lus ion  
The results achieved in the English NHS through a regime of targets and related 
incentives suggests that rather than rejecting them because of their admitted drawbacks, 
there is scope to use targets and related incentives sparingly to improve performance in 
the New Zealand public health system.  The challenge is to learn from the English 
experience and elsewhere in order to maximise their social benefits and minimise their 
costs as part of a range of different approaches to performance improvement. 
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Append ix  1 :  Fur ther  t rends  in  wa i t ing  and  wa i t ing  
l i s ts  in  the  Eng l i sh  NHS 
Figure 8: Percentage of patients with access to a GP within 48 hours or to a primary 
care professional (PCP) within 24 hours 
 
Source:  Department of Health (2005) Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS.  London: Department of Health 
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Figure 9: Patients waiting over 13 weeks for an outpatient appointment 
 
Source:  Department of Health (2005) Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS.  London: Department of Health 
Figure 10: Inpatient waiting list numbers 
 
Source: Department of Health (2005) Chief Executive’s Report to the NHS.  London: Department of Health 
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Figure 11: Inpatient waiting times (months waited) 
 
Source:  Leatherman (2005) 
 
 
